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Abstract 
ISAAC PRESTON WHITE: International Initiatives in Serbia:  The Importance of 
Determinacy and Elites’ Cost-Benefit Analyses 
(Under the direction of Dr. Robert Jenkins) 
 
 Instances of international organizations pursuing their political and 
economic interests in Serbia have proliferated since the ousting of former 
President Slobodan Milošević in 2001.  However, the successes of international 
organizations in pursuing these political and economic interests have varied.  
This thesis examines three cases of international conditionality in Serbia since 
2001:  the International Monetary Fund’s efforts to persuade Serbian elites to 
adopt austerity measures, the European Union’s pursuit of its energy interests 
and the European Union’s attempts to induce full judicial reform.  The thesis 
posits that in order to understand the varied success of these three initiatives, 
one should identify both the determinacy of the policy and Serbian elites’ cost-
benefit analyses.  
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 Introduction 
In late April 2009 over ten thousand Serbian workers gathered to protest 
in the streets of Belgrade.  The Association of Independent Trade Unions and 
other smaller unions protested the Serbian government’s decision to pursue new 
austerity measures negotiated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
Among other measures, this new austerity policy would not only freeze the 
wages of public workers and their pensions, but also reduce the number of public 
sector jobs.  When asked about the outcome of the meeting with the IMF and 
how the public would react, Labor Minister Rasim Ljajić said that he had “no 
optimistic message for (this) Labour Day Observance.”1  A union leader, Ljubisav 
Orbović, argued that the new measures were “slow, wrong, and inefficient” and 
that the government had “no vision or strategy.”  Furthermore, these measures 
did not enjoy a large majority of support within the parliament.  In fact, the bill 
adopting these austere measures that met conditions set by the IMF only passed 
with 127 of 240 votes.2 
 The policy negotiated between the IMF and Serbian elites that caused this 
protest was the result of an international organization’s efforts to pursue a
                                                        
1 “Serbian trade unions protest government austerity plan.” SETimes.com. 30 Apr. 2009.  Web. 11 Feb. 
2010. 
<http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/newsbriefs/2009/04/3
0/nb-10>. 
 
2 “Serb workers protest austerity plan.” Associated Press Worldstream. 29 Apr. 2009.  Lexis-Nexus. 
Web. 11 Feb. 2010. 
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particular policy in Serbia.3  Often times, a domestic actor or group of actors 
resists these policies because the policies are viewed as being threatening to 
some part of their well-being.  Given Serbia’s growing relationship with the West, 
there are an increasing number of instances in which Western initiatives that 
promote certain measures are meeting resistance from various domestic actors. 
 This paper analyzes three instances of contested international policies in 
Serbia and attempts to determine why the successes of international 
organizations attempting to promote these interests varied.  The first instance I 
examine is the IMF’s attempts to persuade the Serbian government to adopt the 
controversial austerity measures that caused the 2009 protests.  Secondly, this 
paper examines the European Union’s (EU) varied success in pursuing its 
energy interests in Serbia.  Finally, this paper looks at the EU’s activities aimed 
to galvanize judicial reform in Serbia.   
 To better understand why the success of these policies varied and how 
the Serbian government handled the interplay between international and 
domestic actors in these three instances of international policy promotion, one 
should identify both the determinacy of the policy and examine Serbian elites’ 
cost-benefit analyses of adopting these policies.  A comparison between these 
three issues allows us to see similarities and differences in both determinacy and 
                                                        
3 It is important to clarify the term “elites” when used in this analysis.  In this paper, the term “elites” 
refers to political leadership unless otherwise indicated.  This is not to say that economic elites are 
not important to my analysis.  To the contrary, economic elites are quite important when it comes to 
political decisions about the economy.  In most democracies, political elites must satisfy economic 
actors’ interests to some degree in order to receive the economic elites’ support and funding.  Given 
the deals that are certainly struck behind closed doors, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact roles of 
economic elites.  However, I am able to write about current economic elites with educated guesses 
formed by third party observations.  
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the cost-benefit analyses.  The policies that the international organizations 
succeeded to promote seemed to be both high in determinacy and provided 
sufficient benefits that outweighed the costs of policy adoption. 
But what was determinacy and what shaped cost-benefit analyses?  The 
determinacy of the policy was formed by three factors: specificity, succinct 
communication, and coherency.  The specificity of a policy refers to how precise 
a policy or interest is.  Does a policy address a particular issue and present 
specific criteria that should be met in order to satisfy the interests of the 
international organization?  The second factor of high determinacy is the level of 
succinct communication between the interested external actor and the internal 
actor.  An external actor exhibits succinct communication when it clearly 
communicates its policies to the internal actor.  This communication may be via 
private meetings, press releases, or publically released organization documents.  
Finally, coherency refers to consistency in policy promotion.  Is an external 
actor’s stance on an issue consistent and do the members of that external actor 
(should it be an IGO) adhere to the same standards that are being promoted?     
In order to understand Serbian elites’ cost-benefit analyses, one should 
first identify both the costs and the benefits in each case.  The first cost relates to 
coalition integrity.  Would the adoption of a policy threaten the strength or even 
the continuation of the governing coalition?  Second, Serbian elites considered 
the electoral impact of the policy.  Would adoption cause public outcry and 
threaten the political viability of elected politicians.  Third, the economic costs of a 
policy mattered.  What were the negative economic impacts of policy adoption?  
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Finally, Serbian elites considered any opportunity costs.  Were there any 
alternative benefits from a third-party that were more attractive to Serbian elites.   
 The benefits in the cost-benefit analyses were three fold.  First, what new 
capital would result of the policy or the adoption of the policy?  This included both 
foreign investment and new revenue that resulted due to the policies, like in the 
case of revenue creation from pipelines in Serbia.  Second, would there be an 
increased sense of security.  The manner of sense of security varied from 
financial security to health security.  Whether a Serbian elite cared about the 
well-being of the public for well-being’s sake did not necessarily matter.  
Common sense tells us that a happy public is less likely to threaten the political 
lives of elites.  Finally, would the policy truly provide political solutions to real 
problems?  A policy that would solve inflation problems or energy security 
problems were more attractive than policies that did not provide real life 
solutions.  
 It should be noted that there are temporal considerations in elites’ cost-
benefit analyses.  The costs and benefits outlined in this introduction and 
examined in this paper are concerned with a short-term incentive model.  How do 
these costs and benefits impact the immediate behavior of Serbian elites?  The 
incentive of eventual EU membership is not as potent in these cases because 
this is a medium to long-term incentive.  However, in a long-term evaluation, the 
benefit of EU membership or the cost of being left behind others in the region 
joining the EU would both hold greater salience in elites’ analyses.  In the 
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immediate future, EU membership is not a salient incentive and therefore does 
not enjoy the same influence in the short-term as IMF tranches.    
This manner of evaluating the adoption of international conditionality 
assumes that Serbian elites were “rational-bargaining” actors that were motivated 
by their cost-benefit analyses.  That is, Serbian elites were “strategic utility-
maximizers interested in the maximization of their own power and welfare.”4  The 
merits of the “rational-bargaining” model have been widely written about and 
serve the purposes of this paper well.5  One can use this model in order to better 
understand the interplay between the benefits of adopting a certain policy and 
the costs of that policy. 
This implicit reliance on the rationalist-bargaining model to evaluate the 
importance of the cost-benefit analyses in this paper should not be viewed as an 
indictment of alternative models of Serbian elites’ policy adoption behavior.  To 
the contrary, I believe that popular alternative models, in particular the “social 
learning model” and the “lesson-drawing model” may be used as important tools 
in calculating the cost of a policy.  Without these two alternative models, one is 
less able to ascertain the costs of a particular policy. 
                                                        
4 Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier. "Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to 
the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe." Journal of European Public Policy 11.4 
(2004): 663.  Web.  
 
5 A convincing piece on the merits of the rational-bargaining model may be found at Schimmelfennig, 
Frank. The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
UP, 2003. Print.  
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The social learning model assumes that there is a ”logic of 
appropriateness.”6  Actors are motivated by internalized beliefs and norms and 
that rule transfer is characterized by these actors belief that a policy is legitimate 
and therefore they should adopt the policy.  I believe that this appropriateness 
should be considered, but as part of the cost calculation.  If the IMF or EU 
attempted to pursue a certain policy in Serbia and this policy was not legitimate 
or appropriate in the opinion of domestic actors, then the costs of adopting this 
policy increased.  Therefore, the social learning model may fit within the rational-
bargaining model. 
 The lesson-drawing model actually had the inverse effect on the cost 
evaluation.  This model suggests that non-EU member states adopt rules without 
EU incentives.  Richard Rose suggests that states adopt external rules when 
there is “dissatisfaction with the status quo” within the domestic sphere.7  In these 
instances, the costs of adopting a policy advocated and pursued by an 
international actor decreased if the public believed these rules will solve domestic 
problems.  In both instances, the rational bargaining model may utilize alternative 
models to calculate costs and I do so in my analysis.   
 This paper is divided into three sections.  Each section examines the 
varying degree of success of the IMF and EU to promote their interests based on 
factoring both the determinacy of the policy and the elites’ cost-benefit analysis.  
The first section examines a case in Serbia when there was high determinacy 
                                                        
6 Noutcheva, Gergana. “EU Conditionality, State Sovereignty and the Compliance Patterns of Balkan 
States.” 
 
7 Rose, Richard. "What is Lesson-Drawing?" Journal of Public Policy 11.1 (1991): 3-30. Web. 
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and the benefits outweighed the costs in the minds of elites.  The recent IMF 
activity in Serbia aimed at forcing Serbian elites to adopt unpopular austerity 
measures was a case in point of this situation.  In the second section, I examine 
the EU’s attempts to pursue its energy interests in Serbia.  It is a case in Serbia 
when the policy lacked determinacy but the benefits of complying with the policy 
still outweighed the costs in specific instances and hence there was partial 
compliance, particularly in the area of energy regulations.  In this instance there 
was a greater degree of flexibility for elites to create policy and there was only 
partial compliance with the EU’s interests.  The case also presented one with an 
instance of cross-conditionality that undermined the EU’s interests; in this case 
Russian interests undermined the EU’s energy security.  The final section 
examines the EU’s attempt to push comprehensive judicial reform in Serbia.  
This was a case when the EU pursued a policy with high determinacy in Serbia, 
but did not do an adequate job of offering benefits that outweighed the costs of 
adopting the judicial policy in its entirety.  Instead, Serbia only partly adopted the 
EU backed policies.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 IMF Austerity Measures  
 The International Monetary Fund’s activities in Serbia in the eighteen 
months since October 2008 present a case of international success in a situation 
of policy promotion. This is the policy outcome of a high determinacy 
international initiative that provided enough benefits to shift the cost-benefit 
calculation in favor for the external actor.  Contrary to internal resistance, the IMF 
accomplished its goal to encourage Serbian elites to adopt fundamental austerity 
policies.  Why and how they succeeded is the focus of this section.  
 In order to better understand how the IMF not only succeeded but also 
continues to succeed to promote policy in Serbia, this section begins with an 
examination of the determinacy of the policy.  This examination is followed by a 
discussion of how both the costs and the benefits were determined in the Serbian 
elites’ analysis of whether or not to adopt the IMF’s austerity measures.   
Determinacy 
An important part of the determinacy equation is the level of clarity of the 
international goal expectations as well as how succinctly the international 
organization communicates those expectations and the degree of coherency of 
the policy.  The IMF succeeded in accomplishing these three things.  First, the 
IMF clearly stated its goals for the region; then it laid out a general platform of the 
areas of the economy it wished to be reformed and how to accomplish those 
goals.  During negotiations with Serbia, the IMF pursued specific goals designed
 9 
to meet the expectations outlined in its platform. Finally, the IMF’s message was 
consistent and the members of the IMF did not pursue nor communicate the 
desire to pursue policies contrary to those promoted by the IMF. 
Succinct Communication 
The IMF outlined its goals in a January 2009 statement that listed the 
IMF’s concerns about the state of the Serbian economy.  In this statement, the 
IMF communicated its desire to safeguard Serbia’s financial security through 
“strengthened policies, designed to underpin an orderly rebalancing of the 
economy.”8  These “strengthened policies” were meant to encourage “upfront 
financial restraint,” address growing inflation, strengthened crisis preparedness, 
and ensure “reforms to boost the economy’s supply side.”9 
 In this statement, the IMF further specified its goals in Serbia with a policy 
package that outlined the policies that would address threats to Serbia’s 
economy.  According to the IMF, its policy package focused on “tightening of the 
fiscal stance, strengthening the inflation targeting framework, making good use of 
the accumulated financial sector buffers, and implementing structural policies.”10  
The IMF was sure to outline the most important changes they wished to see in 
Serbia’s economy.   
 After signaling its general goals for the Serbian economy and its general 
program platform designed to address the economy’s shortcomings, the IMF still 
                                                        
8 “IMF Approves €402.5 million Stand-By Arrangement for Serbia.”  International Monetary Fund. 
Press Release No. 09/12. 16 Jan 2009.  Web. 2 Mar. 2010 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pr0912.htm>.  
 
9 Ibid. 
 
10 Ibid. 
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needed to negotiate the specific policies that supported its platform.  These 
negotiations prompted the protests described in the introduction.   
Specificity  
The IMF’s program in Serbia was quite specific.  In order to receive IMF 
aide, Serbia needed to meet a series of objectives.  These objectives ranged 
from establishing Serbian banking practices that would reduce non-performing 
loans (NPL) to reforming tax collection statutes.11  Due to the specific nature of 
the IMF’s measures, critics and protestors were able to find precise measures 
they opposed.   The trade unions did not protest the entirety of the IMF’s efforts.  
For instance, the workers did not protest the banking and tax reforms nor the 
IMF’s effort to improve “the monitoring of risks and setting up comprehensive 
contingency plans”12 to counter future financial instabilities.  These efforts did not 
threaten the workers’ perceived well-being.   
However, there were three specific measures that threatened the workers’ 
perceived interests, the first of which was the IMF’s desires to force Serbia to 
freeze the wages of public workers.  According to the IMF, public workers’ wages 
required freezing in order to help balance the Serbian budget.  The backlash 
against this measure increased due to the fact that Serbia agreed to this wage 
                                                        
11 “Republic of Serbia—Second Review Under the Stand-By Arrangement and Requests for Waiver of 
End-September Performance Criterion, Modification of End-December Performance Criteria, 
Rephasing of Purchases, and Financing Assurances Review.” International Monetary Fund. Report No. 
10/25. 8 Dec. 2009. Web. <http://www.bcc.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr1025.pdf>. 
 
12 Ibid. 
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freeze during a time when increasing inflation sat at around 7 percent13 and 
continued to decrease the value of their already low pay.14  
 The second issue that Serbian workers protested was the freezing of 
pension disbursements.  Leading up to Serbia’s January 2009 agreement with 
the IMF, politicians in Serbia seriously discussed increasing the dispersal amount 
to pensioners to almost 70 percent of what an average Serbian worker earned.15  
This increase would have occurred during a time when economists in Serbia said 
the world was actually reducing pensions in relation to the average salary.16  This 
proposed pension increase was an understandably popular policy with many 
Serbs and many workers were angry when the IMF required Serbia to backtrack 
on these pension increases.  But the IMF remained firm on this issue requiring 
“strict income policies for containing…pension growth.”17    
Finally, in order for Serbia to receive aid from the IMF, Belgrade agreed to 
arguably the most politically controversial measure: reduction in the public 
workforce.  Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Cvetković’s government acquiesced to 
IMF demands to eventually cut eight thousand state jobs.  In February 2010 the 
government projected a total of three thousand job cuts as a first step toward 
                                                        
13 “Inflacija u 2008. Godini 6,8 odsto.” B92.com. 30. Dec. 2008. Web. 24 Feb. 2010. 
<http://www.b92.net/biz/vesti/srbija.php?yyy=2008&mm=12&dd=30&nav_id=337086>. 
 
14 “Agency examines Serbia’s talks with IMF on 3 billion loan, strings attached.” BBC Monitoring 
Europe. 21 Mar. 2009.  Lexus-Nexus. Web. 1 Mar. 2010. 
 
15 “Serbian economists warn of pension increase problems.” BBC Monitoring Europe. 7 Aug. 2008. 
Lexus-Nexus. Web. 1 Mar. 2010.  
 
16 Ibid. 
 
17 “IMF Approves €402.5 million Stand-By Arrangement for Serbia.” 
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meeting the eventually goal of eight thousand lay-offs.18  In order to facilitate 
these lay-offs, Serbian Financial Minister Mladjan Dinkić announced that 
employees deemed redundant by his ministry would not receive a salary and 
ministers who did not fire redundant employees within their sectors would be 
penalized.19  
Coherency 
 The IMF’s measures were also high in coherency.  The reason the IMF 
was able to promote a singular message and not worry about its members 
signaling contrary interests in Serbia is because there was high internal support 
for the measures within the IMF.  These are the three reasons for this high 
coherency.  First, policies pursued by the IMF typically enjoy high internal 
support given the nature of the internal decision making process.  In order to 
pursue a goal externally, a policy must pass a vote of the IMF’s board of 
governors with at least an 85 percent majority.20  Second, the measures that the 
governors approve tend to be part of a larger normative belief system.  The 
specific measures in a targeted state, in this case Serbia, follow the IMF’s 
norms.21  Finally, the board of the IMF is not a collection of private actors. 
                                                        
18 Nenadovic, Aleksandra. “Serbia’s Wage Increases Were in Breach of Agreement, IMF Says.” 
Bloomberg.com. 5 Feb. 2010.  Web. 9 Feb. 2010.  
<http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601102&sid=a5cDtoIKIClM>. 
 
19 “Serbia to cut 20 percent of state jobs under IMF plan.” Associated Press. 16 Sept. 2009.  Web. 20 
Feb. 2010. <http://sify.com/finance/serbia-to-cut-20-pct-of-state-jobs-under-imf-plan-news-
business-jjqkJychhih.html>. 
 
20 “U.S. Congress Vote Marks Big Step For IMF Reform, Funding.” International Monetary Fund.  18 
June 2009.  Web.  18 Feb. 2010. 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2009/NEW061809A.htm>. 
 
21 The measures follow the beliefs and goals outlined in detail in the IMF’s “Financial Organization 
and Operations of the IMF.” 
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Instead, it is composed of government officials representing the interests of their 
states.  Therefore, states like the United States and the United Kingdom are able 
to promote their interests at the IMF and do not independently pursue policies 
counter to the IMF’s.    
The high determinacy of these international policies is only half of the 
evaluation when analyzing why the Serbian government adopted the IMF’s 
policies.  One must also consider the Serbian elites’ cost-benefit analysis of 
adopting the IMF’s policy of reform that included these unpopular measures.  If 
the costs outweighed the benefits of adopting these measures, then it would 
have been less likely that the political decision makers would have adopted the 
IMF’s plan. 
Cost-Benefit 
 The cost-benefit analyses of elites about whether to adopt the IMF’s 
policies were considerations of both political and economic outcomes.  Did the 
political costs and risks associated with the measures outweigh any the political 
benefits?  Did the economic benefits coming from the IMF outweigh the 
economic costs of cutting back on spending and firing public employees?    
Costs 
Electoral Impact 
For Serbian politicians, a considerable cost came from an unhappy voting 
populace that understandably objected to measures that threatened their 
immediate financial security.  Given the already contentious nature of Serbian 
politics, the adoption of the IMF’s policy could have cost the ruling coalition, For a 
 14
European Serbia (ZES), during the next parliamentary and presidential 
elections.22  A controversial policy could have led to an exodus of voters from the 
ranks of the ZES.  And this exodus would not just create apathetic voters. To the 
contrary, this exodus could have created an even more critical political problem 
for the ZES.  These newly unemployed or employed-yet-still- upset voters tended 
to support For a European Serbia’s then political rival, the Serbian Radical 
Party.23   
Coalition Integrity   
Besides the cost of losing voters, the Serbian leadership also had to 
consider the continuation of what many Serbian political observers consider a 
tenuous ZES governing coalition.  Given the nature of the multi-party politics in 
Serbia, the ZES captured a plurality of votes in the 2008 parliamentary election 
by forming a coalition of five parties.24  Then, following the ZES victory in the 
election, the ZES decided to ally itself with the Socialist Party of Serbia(SPS) 
because the ZES needed the SPS in order to enjoy a governing majority in 
parliament.25  Because the governing coalition is composed of multiple parties 
                                                        
22 The timing of Serbia’s adoption of the measures may have mitigated these costs in Serbian elites’ 
minds.  The Serbian legislature passed the bill that met the IMF’s measures in early 2009, three years 
before the next parliamentary elections.  It is quite possible that those legislators that voted for the 
bill hoped that the results of the IMF’s austerity measures would be evident by the 2012 
parliamentary elections.  
 
23 Bakić, Jovo. “Extreme-Right Ideology, Practice, and Supporters: Case Study of the Serbian Radical 
Party.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 7. 2 (August 2009): 193-207.  
  
24 “DS coalition wins, set to seek partners.” B92.com. 11 May 2008. Web. 4 Mar. 2010. 
<http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2008&mm=05&dd=11&nav_id=50146>.     
 
25 Stojanovic, Dusan. “Serbian parliament OKs new coalition government.” The Seattle Times.  7 July 
2008. Web. 5 Mar. 2010. 
<http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2008037688_apserbiagovernment.html>. 
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representing varying interests, whether they be economic interests or domestic 
interest groups, a major controversial political decision could have led to a split in 
ZES.  
The risk of splitting the coalition was also present because the IMF’s 
policy threatened parties’ influence within the bureaucratic structure of the 
Serbian government.  The Serbian coalition parties divided amongst themselves 
the government’s ministerial positions.  Six different parties held at least one 
ministerial post and therefore enjoyed some semblance of control over that part 
of the bureaucratic structure.26  The IMF policy clearly stated that the Serbian 
government would be required to cut jobs within those ministries and this 
measure met resistance from the ministers.27  It is important to note that parties 
other than the coalition-leading Democratic Party held important ministries within 
the Serbian government.  The viability of the governing coalition was threatened 
if the SPS, who’s political leader Ivica Dačić was the Minister of the Interior,28 
threatened to leave the governing coalition if the Ministry of the Interior was 
forced to cut employees and reduce its perceived influence within the Serbian 
bureaucracy.  And if the fact that cutting employees within ministries met 
resistance from members within the coalition, then recent talks of combining 
                                                        
26 “Members of the Government.” Serbian Government. Web. 5 Mar. 2010. 
<http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vlada/sastav.php>. 
 
27 “Serbia to cut 20 percent of state jobs under IMF plan.” 
 
28 Ibid. 
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ministries and hence cutting ministerial positions could create an full blown 
schism within the fragile coalition.29  
Economic Costs 
 The economic costs of adopting the IMF’s austerity measures were not 
quite as apparent.  However, there is literature indicating that a state’s 
cooperation with the IMF actually stunts long-term growth.  For example, Adam 
Przeworski and James Raymond Vreeland argue, “(IMF) program participation 
lowers growth rates for as long as countries remain under a program.”30  Whether 
or not Serbian elites considered this type literature condemning the IMF is 
unclear.   Even if Przeworski and Vreeland are correct, the economic costs of 
Serbia’s relationship with the IMF may not be clear for the immediate future.  
Opportunity Costs 
The opportunity costs in this situation were low.  The IMF offered Serbia 
the largest package of benefits, which this paper examines shortly.  And given 
the major economic power states comprise a portion of IMF membership, there 
were few alternatives to the IMF.  In short, adopting IMF policies would not have 
cost Serbia a package of similar or greater benefits from an alternate party.     
Benefits 
In order to potentially risk their political livelihood, Serbian elites who 
supported the IMF’s policy would most likely need to be presented with 
overwhelming benefits.  In this instance, the main benefits were new capital and 
                                                        
29 “Govt. to cut number of ministries.” B92.com. 25 Mar. 2009. Web. 5 Mar. 2010. 
<http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2009&mm=03&dd=25&nav_id=58066>.       
 
30 Przeworski, Adam and James Raymond Vreeland. “The effect of IMF programs on economic 
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solutions for economic problems.  To lesser and less immediate degree, there 
was a slight benefit an increased sense of security.  Furthermore, the appeal of 
the new capital in this instance met Schemmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s three 
standards of aid that increase appeal: the size of the benefits, the speed with 
which the targeted state receives those benefits, and the credibility of the 
interested organization to provide those benefits.  In this case, the IMF provided 
benefits large in size, credible, and with speed.    
New Capital 
 The monetary rewards offered by the IMF were substantial and necessary.  
Initially, Serbia’s agreement to adopt the IMF measures allowed Serbia to draw 
402.5 million Euros in loans.31  This huge sum would permit Serbia a degree of 
security given the global market downturn at the time.  In fact, due to this 
downturn, Serbia found itself in need of large sums of aid in order to boost its 
foreign currency reserve and supplement the lost foreign investment coming into 
Serbia that was curtailed during the financing crisis of the previous year.32  
Furthermore, at the beginning of 2009, Serbia’s GDP fell 3.5 percent from what it 
was the year before and unemployment was close to 20 percent.  Inflation 
remained high (approximately 8 percent) and the economic crisis within the EU 
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reduced demand for Serbian chemical and steel exports, a major source of 
Serbia’s revenue.  In fact, steel exports fell 62.7 percent from the year before.33       
 The large sum of aid that the IMF offered to Serbia increased months after 
the initial agreement.   As the market continued to struggle, the state of the 
Serbian economy continued to spiral downward, which forced Serbia to approach 
the IMF to renegotiate the amount of aid available for withdrawal in May 2009.  
Citing the need to fund spending cuts in a weakening economy, the Serbian 
government requested and received a new loan worth 3.2 billion Euros.34  The 
IMF seemed to grant Serbia’s request because it expected the Serbian economy 
to contract even more (by about 2 percent) in 2009 and wished to ensure that the 
financial pressures would not cause Serbia to abandon the new austerity 
policies.35 
 As if the 3.2 billion Euro loan was not in and of itself enough to persuade 
Serbian authorities to pursue interests aligned with the IMF’s goals, the speed 
with which Belgrade would receive the loans increased the likelihood of the IMF’s 
success.  The IMF agreed to allow Serbia to withdraw funds from the 3.2 billion 
Euro loan at intervals the IMF deemed fit.  In May 2009, only two months after 
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the IMF-Serbian agreement, Belgrade withdrew its first tranche worth 788 million 
Euros.36   
This process of withdrawing tranches at intervals was and remains an 
important benefit for both Serbia and the IMF.  For Serbia, the government did 
not have to wait an extended period of time for the aid while implementing its 
reforms.  This made the aid more appealing because the rewards were not 
coming five to ten years in the future.  For the IMF, this process allowed the IMF 
time to evaluate whether their policies were being adopted and implemented.  
Essentially, the tranche intervals allowed the IMF to enjoy continued bargaining 
power during Serbia’s reforms. 
 The third factor that increased the appeal of the IMF’s proposed aid was 
the high credibility of the IMF.  Serbian officials knew that the IMF was able to 
provide Serbia with the benefits the IMF promised.  When Serbia agreed to 
undertake the measures proposed by the IMF, Serbia’s relationship with the IMF 
was ten years old.  After a seven year hiatus in the Serbia-IMF relationship 
during Slobodan Milošević’s presidency, Serbia agreed to cooperate with and 
receive funding from the IMF again in 2000.37  The high credibility of the IMF 
eased the minds of Serbian elites that they would receive benefits from the IMF.  
Increased Sense of Security 
 The presence of a benefit due to an increased sense of security varies 
dependent upon the actor.  Obviously, the trade unions that protested the 
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measures certainly did not find an increased sense of security in the measures 
because the policy froze wage increase and pension pay.  Those who held NPLs 
also felt the impact of the measures when they were taken to court or fined.   
 The benefit of an increased sense of security will be more apparent if the 
IMF measures accomplish the IMF program’s stated goals.  For instance, the 
projected GDP growth for 2010 is expected to be 2 percent and a further 3 
percent in 2011.  Moreover, inflation in 2009 fell faster than expected and 
projections predict a similar pattern in 2010.38  These are the types of economic 
improvements that the IMF says will create macroeconomic and financial stability 
and the resulting economic well-being and financial security of Serbs.  
Political Solution Benefit 
 The political benefit of adopting the IMF’s austerity measures may best be 
described as a calculated risk that could (hopefully?) become a reward in the 
future.  The deteriorating economy could potentially have been politically costly if 
not addressed which allowed Serbian elites to take a calculated risk.  Either risk 
political power because the economy deteriorated without working with a 
reputable international organization which had economic expertise or risk political 
power by alienating portions of the coalition by working with that international 
organization.  In either case, a portion of the voting populace would be angered 
by the government’s policies.   The best way to appease the voting populace in 
the long term was to undertake major economic reforms and the best way to do 
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that would be to work with the IMF.  The calculated risk that the Serbian 
government took seemed to make the most sense, both politically and 
economically.  It may be important to note that some believe that given partial 
breakup of SRS in 2008, the ZES was in strong enough of a position to pass 
these measures and whether the storm of internal dissent.39        
Summary 
 The policy outputs resulting from the IMF varied in both nature and degree 
of success.  Serbia met all quantitative standards, including the target on the 
fiscal deficit (4 ¼ percent of the GDP).40  Furthermore, the IMF was satisfied with 
the Serbia’s progress addressing the IMF’s wage and pension concerns.41  The 
Serbian government reiterated its concentrated efforts on cutting the public work 
force in the year 2010.  Whether or not these goals are met remain to be seen, 
but the IMF were convinced enough of Serbia’s austerity efforts enough to 
approve a €360 million disbursement in March 2010.42 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
39 "Serbia: Country outlook." Economist Intelligence Unit.  5 Feb. 2009. Academic OneFile. Web. 17 
Mar. 2010. 
 
40 “IMF Reaches Staff-Level Agreement with Serbia on Third Review of Stand-By Arrangement.” 
International Monetary Fund. 23 Feb. 2010. Web. 2 Apr. 2010. 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr1057.htm>. 
 
41 “IMF Executive Board Completes Third Review Under Stand-By Arrangement with Serbia and 
Approves €360 Million Disbursement.” International Monetary Fund. 31 Mar. 2010. Web. 2 Apr. 2010. 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr10131.htm>.  
 
42 Ibid.  
 22
IMF Austerity Measures 
Figure 1: Determinacy of IMF Austerity Measures 
Determinacy Factor Level 
Succinct Communication High 
Specificity  High 
Coherency High 
Figure 2: Costs of IMF Austerity Measures 
Costs Level 
Electoral Impact Potentially High (Trade unions protested 
in streets and this could cost political 
elites’ authority after the next elections) 
Coalition Integrity High  (Measures threatened political 
influence of ministries) 
Economic Costs Low (Possible long-term costs, but not 
readily apparent) 
Opportunity Costs Low (No alternate offers) 
Figure 3: Benefits of IMF Austerity Measures 
Benefits Level 
New Capital High (Most influential benefit.  IMF offered 
billions in aid) 
Increased Sense of Security Varied (For workers, measures seemed 
threatening, but long-term economic 
stability could increase the financial 
security of Serbs. 
Political Problem Solving High (Economy at the time needed reform 
and solutions to serious economic 
problems. 
 EU Energy Policy 
Unlike the IMF, the EU enjoyed only partial success in promoting its 
overall interest with regards to energy policy in Serbia.  Despite the importance of 
energy security to the EU, the Commission has been unable to form a unified 
and comprehensive policy that it can pursue successfully in states like Serbia.  In 
fact, the EU’s former ambassador to Washington, John Bruton, said “energy 
policy is one of the big failures of the European Union in the last fifty years.”43  
This failure continues to hamper the EU’s efforts to realize favorable policy 
decisions in Serbia. 
In order to understand why the EU succeeded to only partially promote its 
energy interests in Serbia, I will first outline the instances of EU success.  In 
these instances, a portion of the EU’s energy policy had high determinacy and 
the benefits of adopting this portion of the EU’s policy outweighed the costs.  
Following the analysis of successful EU energy initiatives, this section analyzes 
the failures of the EU to promote its energy security interests.  This failure was 
due not only to a low determinacy energy security policy, but also due to the fact 
that the EU failed to present Serbian elites with the benefits necessary to 
persuade elites to adopt energy security policies favorable to the EU.   
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Determinacy
Specificity 
 The EU’s energy policies regulating access to energy and market 
mechanisms were specifically outlined.  The EU’s acquis includes a chapter 
devoted to energy policies that outlines the energy legislation and standards that 
must be met before Candidate States are granted EU membership.  The acquis 
chapter includes policies regarding competition and “the internal energy market 
(opening up of the electricity and gas markets, promotion of renewable energy 
sources), energy efficiency, nuclear energy and nuclear safety and radiation 
protection.”44  Because the EU had a very specific set of policies in regard to 
these issues, they were able to pursue these measures in Serbia. 
 Furthermore, the EU possesses highly determinate policies on such 
issues as ensuring the energy efficiency of buildings and the manner in which 
states transport fuels.  The EU even pursues specific goals aimed to reduce 
carbon emissions within the Member States.  These are policies thoroughly 
explained in many EU publications and enjoy a high level of specificity.45  
Succinct Communication 
 The EU succinctly and consistently signaled to Serbia that Brussels 
wished to see the adoption of these standards in the Serbian energy policy.  As 
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early as 2001 the EU pushed for its legislative energy policies in Serbia.  For 
example, the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) in 2001 focused on 
medium and long-term investment in key sectors of energy development as a 
return for the Serbian willingness to seriously discuss energy reform.  Among 
other objectives, during this time EAR focused on the development of energy 
laws.46  The EU also indicated which parts of Serbia’s energy sector did not meet 
EU standards via country progress reports, meetings between the EU and 
Serbian officials, and statements to the media.  
 As a result of EAR’s efforts and other similar EU initiatives in Serbia, in 
2004, after intense internal dialogue among Serbian elites, the Serbia National 
Assembly passed the Serbian Energy Law.  This law met most EU standards.  
This comprehensive energy law intended to regulate the following:47 
• Energy policy objectives and the method of their implementation 
• Energy market organisation and functioning 
• Conditions for regular and high quality consumer energy supply and for 
ensuring safe, reliable and efficient energy production 
• Management of energy transmission, transportation and distribution 
systems and the method of securing the smooth functioning and 
development of these systems 
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• The conditions for and method of carrying out energy activities, energy 
efficiency and environmental protection conditions in carrying out energy 
activities 
• Monitoring of the implementation of this law 
 These regulations were meant to be the cornerstone of a developed policy 
that administered supplies management and handled growing energy demand, 
an EU requirement.48  The main goal of the Energy Law was to “increase of 
overall sector efficiency, security of energy supply, introduction of competition 
and compliance with relevant stipulations of the EU’s acquis communitaire while 
following principles of sustainable development.”49  Furthermore, these policies in 
the bill met the main requirements of the following documents: European Energy 
Charter, Directive 2003/54/EC, Directive 90/547/EEC, Decision of the European 
Parliament and the Council 1254/96/EC, Directive 91/296/EEC, Directive 
90/377/EEC, Directive 2003/55/EC (Gas Directive).50    
The Serbian Energy Law also created multiple energy agencies, most 
notably the Serbian Energy Efficiency Agency (SEEA), meant to increase 
oversight over the energy sector.  These agencies were very important in the 
EU’s estimation in order to ensure an efficiently functioning energy sector in 
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Serbia.51  The SEEA was tasked with making improvements in efficient use of 
final energy, proposing changes in legislation, preparing and implementing 
programs for savings, and various other programs that make more efficient use 
of energy.52  Supposedly, the idea behind this agency was to eventually reduce 
the dependence on foreign energy supplies.  The success of the agency to 
reduce the dependence has remained to be seen. 
Coherency 
 The coherency of the EU’s energy policies promoting the specific energy 
policies outlined in this section was high, in part, due to one important factor.  
Every Member State is also a signatory to the Energy Charter Treaty.53  Under 
the treaty, each country is obliged to abide by the principles that “encourage 
investment and trade, to ensure reliable transit, and to promote efficient energy 
use.”54  Therefore, in instances concerning these policy areas, Member States 
did not typically promote interests contrary to the Energy Charter’s codes.  
Cost-Benefit 
The cost-benefit analysis in this case is interesting.  In this case, neither 
the costs nor the benefits were high.  In the end, in the elites’ cost-benefit 
analyses, the benefits held a slight advantage over the costs. 
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Costs 
Coalition Integrity 
 Unlike the IMF’s austerity measures, the policies that met EU standards 
did not threaten the coalition’s integrity.  At the time of energy laws adoption in 
2004, the Democratic Party of Serbia’s Vojislav Koštunica (DSS) led the 
governing coalition.  These policies passed despite Koštunica’s criticism of the 
EU and his resistance to Serbia’s membership in the EU.  Adoption was partly 
due to the lack of political divisiveness on this issue.  These EU standards did not 
directly interfere with the potential influence or power of any ministries, nor did 
they negatively impact any portion of the voting populace.  The costs of policy 
adoption were low when concerned with coalition integrity. 
Electoral Impact 
  In this instance, the EU-backed energy conditionality to pass new energy 
laws met little resistance from the voting populace.  In the opinion of many Serbs, 
the new EU-friendly energy laws were seen as a solution to rampant energy 
problems they experienced in Serbia almost every year.   For example, the 
energy problems for Serbs were evident during a 2001 USAID mission in Serbia.  
That year the USAID funded a Heating and Energy Efficiency program to help 
freezing Serbs deal with energy shortages and increased energy prices that were 
beyond the means of the average Serb’s budget.55  These shortages and price 
inflation in 2001 were indicative of the general impact that unregulated and 
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unreformed energy policy had on Serbian citizens.  These types of problems 
were why the public costs of these changes were low. 
 The one electoral cost came from the possible loss of support from the 
managers of the large Serbian energy monopoly Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS).  
Because of the new 2004 energy policies, the Serbian government was obliged 
by the new energy measures to divide the vertically integrated monopoly and 
hence reduce the influence and power of the top economic managers of the 
firm.56  Though this was a very unpopular policy among many energy managers, 
it was necessary due to years of isolation, mismanagement, and corruption under 
the Milošević regime.  These years during Milošević’s presidency left the 
company overstaffed, indebted, and with a poorly kept infrastructure.57         
Economic Costs 
 Though not completely negligible, the economic costs of adopting these 
energy policies were minimal.  The real costs to the Serbia government were in 
hiring third parties to help restructure NIS into three parts and in the creation of 
new energy organizations, like the SEEA.  However, given the SEEA’s mission to 
increase efficiency and reduce overall energy costs, the long term benefits of the 
spending may have offset the immediate costs at the time in the minds of elites.   
Benefits 
So what were the benefits in the minds of Serbian elites?  Given the fact 
that Serbian elites adopted these energy policies, it appears that the new capital 
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introduced into the Serbian energy sector, the increased sense of security among 
the populace, and the ability to solve inefficiency within the energy sector all 
outweighed the costs of adoption.   
New Capital 
A benefit of adoption at the time was EU investment in Serbia’s energy 
sector.  This benefit was both immediate and substantial in size.  Because Serbia 
adopted EU policies, the EU agreed to help upgrade Serbian energy facilities.  
The EU renewed heating systems in five towns and helped upgrade a Belgrade 
power station reduce the amount of pollution it created.58  Furthermore, the EU 
undertook projects like constructing a major power transmission line from Nis to 
Skopje in order to create a regional energy market.59  
There was also a long-term possibility of new capital introduction in 
Serbia. For instance, the size of the major benefit in meeting EU demands was 
huge, i.e. possible EU membership.  But the drawback of relying solely on this 
benefit was that this benefit lacked speed, an important quality of an effective 
benefit according to Schemmelfennig and Sedelmeier.   As such, it may be more 
appropriate to say that the incentive of adopting these measures was the right to 
continue negotiating with the EU on Serbia’s hopeful accession path to the EU.                                           
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Increased Sense of Security  
These policies also increased the public’s sense of security.  In this 
instance, the physical well-being of Serbs was assured.  These new measures 
addressed rising prices and energy shortages that created a sense of social 
unrest among the populace, especially in the winter months.  These measures 
took steps to control the pricing of energy.  Though it should be noted that 
internal policies alone could not prevent spikes in energy prices due to the 
international nature of energy trade.60  These new policies also increased political 
security of representatives in the Serbian National Assembly.  Even if real life 
changes in the energy sector were not felt by the populace immediately, 
representatives could point to the policies they adopted as progress towards 
bettering the energy sector and therefore mitigate any political criticism 
concerned with the energy sector during parliamentary elections.     
Political Solution Benefit 
These policies solved two political problems.  First, the policies addressed 
the energy concerns of voters.  As this paper has shown, the new policies 
partially regulated prices voters paid for electricity and other heating sources.  
These policies also prompted the EU to construct new energy facilities and 
hence increase the dependability of the energy sector.  Both upgrades assuaged 
the pressure coming from voters concerning energy problems. 
 Second, because the energy policies required the government to 
restructure NIS, the long-term budgetary burden of NIS reduced due to layoffs 
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and debt restructuring.61  The importance of this budget relief was due to the 
overall state of the Serbia economy at the time.  In 2004, Serbia was highly 
indebted and in need of debt balancing.  The need for increased revenue was 
accompanied by the need to reduce expenditures and the NIS restructuring 
would help reduce these expenditures.62  
 But despite these legislative successes that created energy laws, the 
EU’s overall energy goals in Serbia were only partly realized. The EU interest to 
which Serbia did not acquiesce was of utmost concern to Europe: energy 
security.  The EU’s inability to promote its energy security interests was due to 
the fact that unlike the EU’s efforts to reform legislative policy on market 
functions and energy efficiency, the EU’s energy security initiative was not 
determinate and did not provide Serbian elites with many benefits.  This paper 
defines energy security for the EU as making sure that “a nation and all, or most, 
of its citizens and businesses have access to sufficient energy resources at 
reasonable prices for the foreseeable future free from serious risk of major 
disruption of service.”63  
EU Failure to Promote Energy Security 
The EU’s failure to promote its energy security interests, i.e. insurance 
supply and the manner in which the EU received its energy, in Serbia was 
epitomized by the way Serbia privatized its energy monopoly NIS.  In January 
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2008, the Serbian government agreed to sell fifty-one percent of NIS to 
Gazprom, the Russian natural gas giant.64  As part of the deal, Gazprom agreed 
to invite Serbia to join its proposed South Stream Pipeline.  This pipeline would 
transport natural gas from Beregovaya, Russia to Austria and would run through 
the Black Sea and Eastern Europe.65  This pipeline countered EU interests in 
Serbia because many viewed South Stream as a rival of the EU’s planned 
Nabucco pipeline66 that would also run through Eastern Europe and reduce 
European dependence on Russia natural gas.67  
In this case, the policy that would be most advantageous to the EU would 
have been for Serbia to agree to act as a participant in the proposed Nabucco 
pipeline, or at least agree not to participate in South Stream.  Conceived in 2002, 
Nabucco was the EU’s first attempt to forge a common energy policy that would 
decrease the EU Member States’ dependency on Russian natural gas.  The 
development of the pipeline stalled as a consortium of five European members 
searched for a sixth partner to finance the project. 
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 Figure 4:  South Stream and Nabucco Pipelines
Source: BBC News, “Deal to Boost EU Gas Project”
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coherency behind the policy created by internal discord within the EU concerning 
the energy security.  Though EU Member States were willing to create a 
coherent policy on issues like efficiency and carbon emissions, the issue of 
energy security remained a question of state sovereignty of decision making for 
EU members.  And in order to create a coherent energy security policy, Member 
States would have to relinquish their sovereignty on the sensitive issue.  Most 
Member States rebuffed efforts to create a coherent energy security policy.  
Member States will not sacrifice their sovereignty in areas like energy security, 
which are too important to give up sovereignty.  
New Capital with EU-Friendly Policy 
 Unlike the capital that would result from compliance with the IMF’s 
measures, the capital resulting from a EU-friendly policy in this case would lack 
size, speed, and credibility.  The size of the capital is difficult to calculate in this 
instance because the Nabucco pipeline never became a serious alternative for 
Serbia and there have been few discussions among academic journals and 
international groups about the capital benefits for Serbia that would result from 
the Nabucco pipeline.     
This inability to calculate benefits from Nabucco may be due to the lack of 
immediacy and credibility of the pipeline.  The construction date of Nabucco was 
pushed back time and again due to the lack of funding.  Furthermore, the 
Nabucco pipeline struggled to secure the gas that would fill the pipeline.68  The 
credibility of Nabucco was simply nowhere close to the credibility of South 
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Stream. Pierre Noël, energy analyst at the European Council on Foreign 
Relations, said, "This is a project that does not exist except in the minds of 
Brussels bureaucrats. They think you can build a pipeline and then the gas will 
flow. It's simply not credible."69      
Increased Sense of Security and Political Problem Solving 
 Any claim that Nabucco would provide a higher sense of security for the 
Serbian public and elites or would solve political problems would be conjecture.  
Because Nabucco failed to develop as a viable project, discussions about how 
the pipeline would benefit Serbs lacked any proof.  Would Serbia receive transit 
tariffs?  Would there be new gas storage facilities built in Serbia?  Both of these 
benefits would address both security (reliable heat) and political problems 
(securing energy or increasing revenue to the state via transit taxes).  These 
questions were never addressed and therefore it is difficult to determine any 
increased sense of security or any solutions to political problems. 
Opportunity Costs of EU-Friendly Policy 
The unpersuasive benefits of the EU were further degraded by the 
opportunity costs, or what Schemmelfennig and Sedelmeier refer to as cross-
conditionality.  According to Schemmilfennig and Sedelmeier, cross-conditionality 
occurs when a third party offers a state an alternate set of comparable benefits at 
lower adjustment costs.70  In this case, Gazprom presented Serbia with an 
alternate set of benefits greater in size, immediacy, and credibility.  In fact, the 
                                                        
69 Ibid. 
 
70 Zyeno Baran. "EU Energy Security: Time to End Russian Leverage." 
 
 37
success of Gazprom to realize its interests in Serbia is similar to the IMF’s 
success.  Gazprom had a very clear goal (to create a strong regional energy 
market in Eastern Europe) and aggressively pursued it. 
So what were the benefits for Serbia to privatize with Gazprom and join 
the South Stream Pipeline?  Gazprom agreed to pay €400 million for fifty-one 
percent share of NIS.  Some critics of this deal argue that this price signaled a 
sweet-heart deal and Russia bought the majority of NIS for under the price 
evaluated by an outside firm.71  But what these critics fail to mention is that 
Gazprom also agreed to invest over €550 million in upgrading the natural gas 
and oil infrastructure in Serbia.72  This investment into the energy infrastructure in 
Serbia was significant in that it prepared Serbia to become part of the proposed 
Russian-backed South Stream pipeline.    
Financially, the South Stream pipeline would benefit Serbia in two other 
significant ways: as a transit state and reducing Serbian dependence on 
Hungarian-routed energy.  Originally, Gazprom proposed that the South Stream 
be built through Romania, not Serbia.  But as negotiations with Romania began 
to breakdown, Gazprom decided to approach Serbia with a lucrative offer to be a 
transit state.  According to many predictions, Serbia will accrue substantial 
wealth as a transit state by charging the European market transit tariffs on the 
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gas and oil that flows through their infrastructure.  Reported estimates put the 
annual income from transit tariffs at approximately $200 million.73  
            Second, the South Stream pipeline brought incentive in that it could 
potentially reduce Serbian dependency on energy flowing through MOL, the 
infrastructure of the Hungarian energy monopoly.  In 2004, Serbia paid transit 
fees of US$ 19 per thousand cubic meters (tcm) of gas flowing via MOL.  This 
cost was quite high in comparison to energy prices of neighboring states.74 One 
of the problems for Serbia was that the transit fee charged by MOL was based 
upon a complex formula and therefore the fee varied greatly from year to year.75  
Without a steady fee, Serbia was looking for a more diversified, less price 
fluctuating source of energy.         
Another considerable benefit to the deal with Gazprom was the 
construction of a natural gas storage site in northern Serbia.  As part of the 
agreement, Gazprom would construct an underground storage facility in Banatski 
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Dvor.76  Intended to possess the capacity of ten billion cubic meters (Bcm) 
annually, the Banatski Dvor reserve will serve two important purposes.77   
First, this storage facility will satisfy the Serbian ambition to serve as a 
central hub for Russian gas distribution into Europe. This desire hinges upon 
whether Russia decides to extend its energy reach further into the region, a 
venture that is all but certain.  In such a case, Serbia hopes to have an arm of 
South Stream break south from the storage facility.  Such an occurrence would 
greatly increase annual transit tariffs.78    
The facility in Banatski Dvor would also alleviate the energy strain 
currently present in Serbia.  Under its contract with Hungary, Serbia’s average 
demand for natural gas per day was six million cubic meters (Mcm) per day.  This 
amount was well under the agreed maximum cap of energy allotted to Serbia per 
day.  However, the problem was not the average annual demand, but the peak 
daily demand.  During the winter, peak daily demand exceeded the maximum ten 
Mcm limit.  Serbia was unable to receive this much gas a day and did not have 
the energy reserves to supplement this extra demand, putting the Serbian 
government in a difficult position.79  With limited production and no reserves, the 
Serbian government is required to make unpopular, yet necessary decisions, like 
managing consumption.   
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Also, without a reliable reserve of natural gas, Serbia felt the effects of the 
Ukraine-Russia spat over natural gas in January 2009.  Tens of thousands Serbs 
woke up on Orthodox Christmas morning and found their homes without heat.80  
Citizens in a number of large cities had no heat due antiquated central heating 
infrastructures that were unable to switch from a natural gas to an oil heating 
system.  In Novi Sad alone, over eighty thousand citizens were without heat 
during below freezing temperatures.81  
       Once this storage facility was built, there would be the assurance of a stable 
energy supply during peak consumption days.  In order to meet this peak 
consumption demand, a yearly supply of 0.6 Bcm is required to supplement 
average existing gas flows into Serbia per year.  Should Serbia heed European 
Union advice and also acquire a reserve that would last Serbia in a case of 
emergency for three months, an additional .54 Bcm would be required, producing 
an aggregate of 1.15 Bcm.  This target was important because should the 
planned storage facility be built with the capabilities currently intended (4-6 Bcm) 
there would be adequate supplies to meet both domestic Serbian consumption 
demands and the EU required levels of reserves.82  
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Coalition Integrity Cost of the Gazprom Relationship 
 It would be remiss not to consider the coalition integrity costs of NIS’s 
privatization with Gazprom and the resulting construction of the South Stream 
pipeline.  There were some who opposed the deal, most notably Serbian Minister 
of Economy and Regional Development Mladjan Dinkić.  Dinkić, a G-17 Plus 
party member, claimed the sale price was not equal to the fair price value 
determined by the Deloitte&Touche evaluation.83  However, despite Dinkić’s G17 
Plus objections to the deal and opposition to the deal from the League of 
Vojvodina Social Democrats, there was never talk of a split in the coalition.  This 
was an instance when a healthy legislative debate did not threaten the integrity of 
the ZES.84  
Electoral Impact Cost of the Gazprom Relationship 
 The electoral costs of the Gazprom deal were negligible.  Whether it was 
because Serbia would receive large transit tariffs each year or the public’s 
approval of closer ties with Russia, there were no large protests or outcries 
against the deal.  Serbian elites did not consider the electoral response to the 
deal as a cost in preventing NIS’s privatization with Gazprom. 
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Economic Costs of the Gazprom Relationship 
 The economic costs of Serbia’s deal with Gazprom were low.  It should be 
reiterated that Serbia’s close cooperation with Russia in energy policy is not 
contrary to EU standards.  For this reason, the NIS-Gazprom deal would not 
seem to hamper Serbia’s efforts for EU membership.  Member States were not 
able to effectively scold Serbia for acting in a manner similar to the rest of 
Europe, i.e. agreeing in a bilateral deal with a Russian owner enterprise in order 
to secure energy supplies.  In addition to the deals signed for the South Stream 
pipeline, Gazprom signed deals with Eni (Italy), Gasunie (the Netherlands), 
BASF (Germany), E.ON Ruhrgas (Germany), and Gaz de France.85  At worst, 
this deal may have further wasted away any good will that Serbia acquired 
towards membership to the EU that it received after capturing and turning over 
war criminal Radovan Karadzic in June 2008. 
 Critics of the deal point to the loss in initially revenue when Gazprom 
purchased a majority of NIS for less than the Deloitte&Touche price.  This 
criticism stems from the fact that Gazprom purchased a fifty-one percent of NIS 
for a quarter of the value determined by Deloitte&Touche.  However, like this 
paper already indicated, this loss of initially revenue was inconsequential 
because of the immediate direct investment in new infrastructure and storage 
facilities.  Therefore, this loss of initially revenue should not be considered an 
economic cost. 
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There was an economic cost that may have occurred, however unlikely.  
This economic cost could arise if Serbia and Russia have a disagreement over 
an unforeseen issue.  There are two manners in which Russia can use their 
monopoly over natural gas and oil in their implementation of foreign policy. 
Russia could impose a significant price hike when it serves their interests.  For 
example, in 2007 Gazprom and Ukraine quarreled over alleged unpaid Ukrainian 
bills for natural gas.  Gazprom, claiming Ukraine owed $1.3 billion, threatened 
that without payment the company would be forced “to reduce gas deliveries to 
Ukrainian consumers.”86  This threat came after Gazprom substantially raised 
energy prices the previous year.  Eventually, Gazprom broke its contract with 
Ukraine and quadrupled Ukraine’s monthly energy bill.  Some accused Russia for 
punishing the pro-Western Ukrainian government with this price hike.87  Either 
way, the Ukrainian spat continued a recent trend in Russian relations, i.e. using 
natural gas for political means.   
 Should Serbia and Russia find themselves in a similar position, there is a 
historic precedent that shows that price disputes can escalate to an even higher 
level of tension.  Such occurred as recent as January 2009, again between 
Russia and Ukraine.  Amid accusations of Ukraine not paying its bill and 
siphoning off natural gas, Gazprom shut off gas supplies to Ukraine.88  Again, 
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while some accused Russia of punishing pro Western Ukrainian President Viktor 
Yushchenko,89 what matters is Gazprom is willing to cut off natural gas to those 
who are almost completely dependent on it.  The danger Serbia faces is that 
there will be some issue that causes a major rift between the two and the Serbian 
energy supply becomes endangered. 
Summary 
EU energy laws 
Figure 5: Determinacy of EU Energy Laws 
Determinacy Level 
Specificity High 
Succinct Communication High 
Coherency High 
 
Figure 6: Costs of EU Energy Laws 
Costs Level 
Coalition Integrity Low (Kostunica’s government passed 
these laws even though he does not 
support EU integration.) 
Electoral Impact Low (Public supported these reforms.) 
Economic Costs Low (Only costs came from the creation of 
new agencies like the SEEA) 
Opportunity Costs Low  
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Figure 7: Benefits of EU Energy Laws 
Benefits Level 
New Capital Medium (There was some new investment 
in energy infrastructure.) 
Sense of Security High (Laws increased dependability of 
energy prices and, to a degree, supply.) 
Political Problem Solving High (Serbian laws and infrastructure were 
outdated and inefficient.) 
 
EU Energy Security 
Figure 8:  Determinacy of EU Energy Security 
Determinacy Level 
Specificity Low 
Succinct Communication Low 
Coherency Very Low 
 
Figure 9: Costs of EU Energy Security 
Costs Level 
Opportunity Costs Very high (This cost was enough to make 
the other costs seem insignificant.) 
 
Figure 10: Benefits of EU Energy Security 
Benefits  Level 
New Capital Low? (Lack of Nabucco development 
made it hard to determine what capital, if 
any, would come to Serbia  
Sense of Security Low? (See new capital explanation) 
Political Problem Solving Low? (See new capital explanation)  
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Serbian Relationship with Gazprom 
Figure 11: Costs of Serbian Relationship with Gazprom 
Costs Level 
Coalition Integrity  Low (Though there were some dissenting 
views, there were no threats to the 
coalition integrity.) 
Electoral Impact Low (No public outcry.) 
Economic Costs Possibly High (Russia could withhold 
energy from Serbia) 
Opportunity Costs Low (The EU offered little alternative 
benefits) 
 
Figure 12: Benefits of Serbian Relationship of Gazprom 
Benefits Level 
New Capital Very High (Gazprom paid for NIS, agreed 
to build storage facilities and upgrade 
energy infrastructure, agreed to include 
Serbia in South Stream pipeline and 
Serbia would receive transit tariff 
revenues from South Stream.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Judicial Reform 
 The case of EU judicial efforts in Serbia differs from both the IMF austerity 
efforts and the EU’s attempts to promote its energy interests.  Similar to the IMF 
efforts, the EU’s judicial policy was clear, specific, and coherent.  But, unlike the 
IMF’s initiative, the EU failed to present Serbian elites with benefits that 
outweighed costs of completely reforming the judiciary.  This may show that a 
policy that is high in determinacy also needs to provide benefits that persuade 
elites to adopt those measures.   
Determinacy         
Succinct Communication 
The importance of judicial reform in Serbia for the EU has been addressed 
repeatedly by the Union. The 2007 EU Commission’s Serbian progress report 
stated that judicial reform was a “key priority of the European Partnership.”  The 
Commission’s 2009 Serbian progress report stated that reform of the judiciary 
was a “key priority of the European Partnership.”90  The statement that judicial 
reform is a priority may also be found in various press releases and interviews.  
But why is judicial reform a priority? 
In general, the desire of the EU and the rest of the international 
community was to ensure that Serbia had a functioning and independent
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judiciary because this type of judiciary is a necessary part of a functioning 
democracy that “ensure(s) the Rule of Law.”91  The importance of a functioning 
and independent judiciary was also due to the “necessity to empower the 
judiciaries of candidate countries to allow them to play a role within the 
Community legal system and to be able to effectively apply the acquis.”92  In fact, 
the former European Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn said, “The 
process of structural adjustment must continue and (Serbia) needs to follow 
through its commitments, particularly in the area of the judiciary and the rule of 
law."93 
Furthermore, the EU pushed for a reformed judiciary in order to change 
Serbs’ perception of the judiciary.  The importance of confidence in the judiciary 
was well articulated by Murray Gleeson, the former Chief Justice of the High 
Court of Australia.  In a 2002 speech given during the Judicial Conference of 
Australia, Gleeson said,“The general acceptance of judicial decisions, by citizens 
and by governments, which is essential for the peace, welfare and good 
government of the community, rests, not upon coercion, but upon public 
confidence.”  Without confidence in the judiciary, social acceptance of decisions 
cannot be guaranteed.  Unless society respects the findings of a court, rule of 
law cannot exist.  It is understandable that the EU desires an independent 
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judiciary in Serbia in order to ensure that the EU standards which Serbian elites 
adopt are enforced and hopefully accepted by the populace. 
The EU’s communication of its goals and the connection between the 
EU’s relationship with Serbia and reforms to the judicial system were seen as 
early as 2001.  In that year Serbia began to receive policy suggestions, provided 
through the EU-FRY Consultative Task Force (CTF).94  The purpose of CTF was 
to prepare Serbia for a negotiation of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
(SAA) with the European Union, a necessary part of the process in attaining EU 
membership.  In order for negotiations to begin, several conditions had to be met, 
such as “principles of democracy, rule of law…and compliance with international 
obligations.”95 
Specificity 
How specific was the EU in what it wished to be reformed within the 
judiciary and exactly how Serbia could address those problems?  The EU was 
quite specific in both regards.  The EU has reinterred as recent as 2009 the goals 
for Serbia’s judiciary.  The EU stated that “further efforts need to be made to 
ensure the independence, accountability, and efficiency of the judicial system.”96  
These comments also reinforced article eighty of the 2007 SAA between the EU 
and Serbia which stated that their partnership would “notably aim at 
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strengthening the independence of the judiciary and improving its efficiency.”97  
The EU made it clear that efficiency and independence were EU priorities. 
The manner to achieve these things was also addressed.  In order to help 
Serbia achieve these goals, the EU funded the Implementation of the National 
Judicial Reform Strategy in the Republic of Serbia project in 2007.  The purpose 
of the project was to ensure the judiciary is “compatible with the Council of 
Europe standards and practises.”98  This project provided many services to 
Serbia.  The Implementation of the National Judicial Reform Strategy in the 
Republic of Serbia project “influence(d) legislative and other reforms, provide(d) 
expertise in the Organisation’s fields of competence, (and) develop(ed) effective 
training programmes.”99  The project also coordinated initiatives between the EU 
and the OSCE, UN, and other initiatives.  
Coherency 
 The coherency of the EU’s judicial reform policies was high.  Serbia was 
not presented with varying messages on the importance of judicial reform or how 
to accomplish the reforms.  In fact, the EU promoted and conducted what it 
termed “twinning” between Serbia and Member States.  The purpose of these 
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initiatives was to promote “capacity building in the Ministry of Justice.”100  The 
EU’s efforts to help Serbia reform its judiciary were not undermined by mixed 
signals concerning expectations and implementations.    
Cost-Benefit 
The determinacy of the EU’s goals and policies was high.  However, the 
ability of the EU to provide benefits that ensured elites consider EU interests was 
suspect.  In fact, IGOs other than the EU may have provided Serbia with the 
benefits that galvanized aspects of judicial reform, like increased transparency.  
But what were the political and economic costs and benefits in this situation?  
Cost 
Coalition Integrity 
The costs of addressing the issues of efficiency and professionalism did 
not threaten the integrity of the various governing coalitions since 2003.  There 
were steps addressing these two issues beginning with the coalition that took 
power following the ousting of Milošević and continuing to today’s current ZES 
coalition.  The fact that each governing coalition passed statutes and 
implemented these laws since 2001 serves of proof of the lack of divisiveness of 
judicial professionalism and efficiency reform within the legislature.101 
The divisiveness arose when coalitions discussed or considered laws that 
would strengthen the independence of the judiciary.  The problem in achieving 
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judicial independence in Serbia was the fact that there were Serbian elites 
opposed to an independent judiciary.  Though the reasons may vary, in general, 
an independent judiciary would not ensure that political elites’ interests would be 
realized in legal settings.  According to an American Bar Association Central 
European and Eurasian Law Initiative document, “The politicization of judicial 
advancement is also thought to have an impact on how some judges decide 
cases that involve the interests of the government or political parties.”102  And if 
not intentionally supporting the elites’ interest, judges may still simply rule in a 
way that attempts to “avoid alienating government interests.”103 
This is not to say that all elites opposed an independent judiciary.  When 
asked what challenges face judicial reform, Dragana Boljevic, Serbia’s President 
of the Judges’ Association, said that one of the main problems is the, “…inability 
of the executive and legislative branches to grant and support independence of 
the judiciary.”104  Many judges understand the problem, but must wait for the 
legislature to grant the judiciary operating independence.   
The European Union’s “Serbia 2008 Progress Report” further expounded 
on the lack of independent judiciary in Serbia.  According to the Commission’s 
report, objective criteria had been developed for the appointment of judges.  Part 
of these criteria was that judges must finish two years of formal training and then 
pass a final exam.  But these criteria were moot because the law containing this 
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language had not been passed.  Without proper standards coming into effect, 
procedures created “concerns that such re-appointment (of judges by the 
legislature) exercise could be affected by undue political influence and disrupt the 
functioning of the judiciary.”105  
Electoral Impact 
The success of the EU in helping Serbia reform its judiciary was in part 
due to the fact that there were minimal costs to these initiatives from the public.  
Serbian elites did not have to limit their cooperation with the EU and other IGOs 
and NGOs due to domestic opposition.  There was no fear among elites that 
judicial reform will alienate their political constituencies. Unlike in the case of the 
IMF reforms, the public never publically protested changes to the judiciary.  Why 
was there little objection?  There was mistrust of the judiciary based upon 
experiences of the populace.  Since the removal of Milošević from power, many 
Serbs still experienced what they considered a corrupt judiciary or an abuse of 
civil rights.  The experience of corrupt behavior in one part of the government 
often times created a mistrust of all parts of the government.  For example, 
Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer 2006 reported that 13 
percent of Serbs indicated that they or someone in their household had paid a 
bribe in the previous year.106   
                                                        
105 “Serbia 2008 Progress Report.” 12. 
 
106 “Report on the Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2006.” Transparency 
International (TI).  7 Dec. 2006. Web.  
<http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb/2006>.  
 
 54
Further explanation for the lack of trust held by Serbs was due to the 
political environment that followed the assassination of former Prime Minister 
Zoran Djindjić.  On March 12, 2003, Prime Minister Djindjić was killed outside of 
his office in Belgrade by a sniper.  Following the assassination, the newly 
appointed Prime Minister Zoran Živković, declared a state of emergency and 
initiated a massive police action, known as Operation Saber (or Sablja).107  Not 
only was Operation Saber directed toward the assassination but also any 
institution believed to be involved in organized crime or corruption.  
This operation shook the confidence in the judiciary because officials 
arrested not only mafia members and Serbian security services personnel (many 
associated with Milošević) but also judges who took bribes or exhibited 
impropriety from the bench.  One high profile offender was Milan Sarajlic, the 
deputy state prosecutor.108  One critic said that “Serbia did not have its own 
mafia, but rather in Serbia the mafia had its own state.”109  If this statement was 
correct and the mafia controlled key members of government, then why should 
citizens obey the laws and authority of those figures?  
The actions taken during Operation Saber had two lingering effects on 
public faith in the judiciary.  First, the arrest of judicial figures understandably 
created doubt of judicial credibility in the public’s mind.  Second, there were 
many claims of human rights abuses during the operation.  During the operation, 
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Amnesty International voiced concerns due to the Ministry of the Interior 
detaining people for up to thirty days without a lawyer or approval by what 
Amnesty International termed a “competent” judicial body.110  In April 2008, 
amendments were added to the “Law on Organization and Jurisdiction of 
Government Authorities in Suppression of Organized Crime” that allowed the 
Ministry of the Interior to detain suspects up to sixty days without a lawyer or 
court authorization.111  
Economic Costs 
The major economic cost of these reform policies arrived due to the need 
to hire new judicial personnel.  For instance, understaffing that resulted in the 
backlog of cases caused the inefficient Serbian judiciary.  While some cases 
concern less threatening offenses, there are important and “high-profile” 
organized crime cases that are not resolved due to this backlog.112  One may 
look to the Serbian commercial courts to see the causes of this backlog.  
According to a USAID survey, the commercial courts receive 75,000 new 
enforcement cases annually and have a total of only 38 enforcement officers.113  
This lack of adequate personnel was not exclusive to the commercial court 
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system, but was rather indicative of the overall personnel capabilities of the 
Serbian judiciary.   
This cost was amplified by Serbia’s relationship with the IMF.  Serbia 
needed to hire new personnel and grow its bureaucracy while trying to comply 
with the IMF’s demands to reduce state expenditures.  This explains why the 
Serbian ministries have not hired a sufficient number of new judges and support 
personnel.  
Opportunity Costs 
 The opportunity costs in this case were low.  Unlike the case of the EU’s 
promotion of its energy security interests, Serbia was not presented with an 
alternative set of benefits from a third party.  The only opportunity costs that may 
have been presented to elites would have come from Serbian economic actors 
who offered Serbian politicians bribes in order prevent the establishment of 
judicial independence.  These bribes would have occurred should the 
independent judiciary jeopardize a pattern of court rulings that were to the 
advantage of those economic actors.  But this type of corrupt opportunity would 
be hard to detect and prove, but should still be mentioned. 
Benefits 
New Capital 
The new capital that resulted because Serbia undertook judicial reform 
efforts was effective in improving professionalism, inefficiencies, and 
transparency.   In particular, this new capital was effective because it met the 
size, speed, and credibility criteria of Schemmelfennig and Sedelmeier.  The EU 
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and other IGOs did not require Serbia to reform an area before aid was made 
available.  Instead, these IGOs provided Serbia with the assistance to reform the 
judiciary and the benefits simultaneously.  In this instance, the benefits did not 
necessarily come in the same manner as it did from the IMF.  Instead of large 
financial loans, the benefits came from training and practical equipment upgrades 
that addressed the shortcomings of the judicial infrastructure, like computers or 
caseload management software.  Precise examples of this capital will become 
clear later in this section during the discussion on the “political problem solving” 
benefits of judicial reform. 
Sense of Security 
Besides the mistrust of the general public, judicial reform also addressed a 
lack of sense of security for business owners in Serbia.  This lack of business 
security was an issue at the beginning of the judicial reform process in 2001.  
That year, judicial reform was a priority of the new post-Milošević government.  
Before his assassination, Prime Minister Djindjić worked with political leaders to 
address this problem. Djindjić and other believed, rightly so, that the corrupt and 
unreformed judiciary retarded economic growth.114   
The unreformed judiciary hampered foreign investment.  A 2005 survey 
conducted by the Serbian Agency for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
(SME) found that 27 percent of those asked felt as though the judiciary served as 
the largest problem in doing business.  Among the problems indicated were lack 
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of transparency, inefficiency, and absence of accountability.115  A continuation in 
this lack of confidence in the judiciary may be seen in Transparency 
International’s 2008 report.  In this report, the Serbian Corruption Perception 
Index number was 3.5 (83rd of 180 nations surveyed).116  These surveys indicate 
that not only do citizens not trust the judicial system, but neither do business 
owners, domestic or international. 
Political Solution Benefit 
The solutions presented by reforming the judiciary to international 
standards, primarily those of the EU, were the greatest benefit in this case.  In 
general these reforms brought many current Serbian politicians, in particular 
members of ZES, closer to their stated goal of EU membership.  As part of both 
the SAA and the acquis, judicial reform had to be addressed in Serbia.  Simply 
put, judicial reform was and remains a part of a larger ZES strategy to join the 
EU.  The ZES works with various IGOs to not only form policy, but also address 
the implementation of these policies. 
So what problems did these policies address?  For one, the EU worked 
with Serbia on laws that would begin to address the lack of a sufficient number of 
judges without requiring Serbia to hire new judicial officials.  On May 25, 2006, 
the Serbian National Assembly adopted “The National Judicial Reform 
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Strategy.”117 According to this strategy, the objective was to create an institute 
that would provide an “organized acquiring and improvement of theoretical and 
practical knowledge and skills necessary for the autonomous, professional and 
efficient administration of justice.”118  The resulting institution that provided this 
training was the Judicial Training Center.  Not only did the Judicial Training 
Center provide professional training to lawyers, judges, and prosecutors, but also 
provided “thematic focused programmes” concerned with areas “such as war 
crimes and organised crime.”119   
The Judicial Training Center is an institutional closely associated with the 
EU and UN’s efforts in Serbia that addressed inefficiencies and 
unprofessionalism.  Due to a lack of resources, know-how, and need for a broker 
between various Serbian institutions participating in the Judicial Training Center, 
the international community was very active in with the Center.  The UNDP, EU, 
and multiple NGOs provided the needed resources and knowledge needed to 
increase efficiency.120  The Judicial Training Center also addressed the quality of 
professionalism among judges and lawyers.   Professionalism now is “relatively 
high and has been further improved by training provided by the judicial 
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academy.”121  But this success should not be mistaken as representative of 
completed success in reforming the unprofessionalism that plagues the judiciary, 
a point the 2009 Serbian progress points out.122 
   The policies also combated the lack of transparency within the judiciary 
that remained a concern of the EU.  According to a 2006 Commission of the 
European Communities report, due to lack of transparency, there is a close bond 
between corruption and organized crime.123  Positions indicated as susceptible to 
and already impacted by corruption were positions within the judiciary.  For 
example, according to the Commission’s report, “40% of public officials failed to 
report on their assets and income, and a high number of political parties failed to 
submit their financial reports to the parliamentary committee for finances.”124  
Without oversight that monitors the income of high-ranking officials, like judges, 
these officials were ostensibly free to participate in dishonest activities and this, 
according to the report, has led to higher rates of corruption.   
The EU and Serbia were not the only two actors to undertake efforts to 
address the lack of transparency in the day-to-day operations of the judicial 
system.  The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) also 
introduced needed financial aid in the judiciary.  USAID offered Serbian 
commercial courts with over 500 workstations, 300 printers, 39 servers, and 
developed a judicial operating system.  The development of this comprehensive 
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computerized case management system was intended, among other things, to 
increase transparency within the judicial system.  This management system 
allowed the general public to access selected court data.  “All parties will be able 
to view and track their cases via the internet, see the date of a hearing, the name 
of the judge, case number, and other essential case information, enabling them 
to monitor the status of their case at any time,” reported Svetlana Konjević, a 
clerk at the court in Sremska Mitrovica.125  This system decreased the chances of 
corruption by randomly assigning judges to cases and theoretically eliminating 
conflict of interests from the bench.   
Summary 
 Despite the changes in professionalism, efficiency, and transparency, the 
European Commission states that judiciary independence is still affected by 
undue political influence.  The source of this influence is applied via the control 
over the judicial budget by the legislative body and the manner in which judicial 
appointments and promotions are decided.  Multiple international organizations, 
including the UN, EU, and USAID, have attempted to address this problem by 
issuing statements criticizing Serbia’s judiciary and then offering benefits should 
the problem be addressed.  But these benefits were not enough for Serbian elites 
to acquiesce their control over the judiciary.   
 The issue of judicial reform seems to be a good example of one of the 
weaknesses of the European Union and the rest of the international community 
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 62
when attempting to influence policy output in a targeted state.  The lack of 
immediate and substantial tangible benefits did not motivate enough elites to 
change their stance on judicial independence and it is unlikely that elites will 
change this stance without either an overwhelming carrot or a threatening stick, 
e.g. threatening Serbia’s EU membership based on this issue. 
Summary 
Judicial Reform 
Figure 13: Determinacy of Judicial Reform  
Determinacy Level 
Succinct Communication High 
Specificity High 
Coherency High 
 
Figure 14: Costs of Judicial Reform 
Costs Level 
Coalition Integrity Varied (The EU’s standards of 
professionalism and efficiency did not 
threaten the interests of Serbian elites.  
The independent judiciary threatened the 
elites’ interests.  This type of judiciary may 
stray from decisions that benefited elites 
politically.) 
Electoral Impact Low (The public did not trust judiciary and 
wished to see reform.) 
Economic Costs High (It was difficult for Serbia to hire new 
judges when the IMF pressured them to 
cut expenditures and public positions.  
Opportunity Costs Low (There were no alternative set of 
benefits.) 
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Figure 15: Benefits of Judicial Reform 
Benefits Level 
New Capital Medium (Though no aid packages as 
large as the IMF’s resulted from the 
reform, there were upgrades of the judicial 
infrastructure.) 
Sense of Security Medium (There is an increasing trust of 
judiciary among business owners.) 
Political Problem Solving High (These policies resulted in large 
improvements in efficiency and 
professionalism.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Conclusion 
In the three cases that this paper examines, the level of determinacy 
played a role in how successful the international organization was at promoting 
its interests and policies in Serbia.  The international policy initiatives in Serbia 
that were succinctly communicated, specific in their interests, and coherent were 
more likely to be successful than policies that lacked these three standards.  
Both the IMF’s austerity measures and the EU’s judicial measures met all three 
criteria.  But the successes of international initiatives were not completely 
dependent upon the degree of determinacy of the policy.   
It is important to recognize that though the IMF and EU both had specific 
goals that were clearly stated, the degree of success of these policies was also 
dependent upon Serbian elites’ cost-benefit analyses of the proposed policies.  
The international organization that had a high determinacy policy goals and 
presented benefits that in the minds of Serbian elites outweighed the costs of 
adopting the particular policy was more likely to achieve its goals than an 
international organization that possessed a clear set of goals but failed to present 
Serbia with benefits that elites deemed satisfactory.  This may have been the 
difference in success between the IMF and the EU’s judicial goals.  Because 
Serbian officials adopted and attempted to implement its measures, it is logical to 
believe the IMF presented Serbia with benefits that offset the costs of adopting 
the policy.  
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The EU’s energy policy in Serbia presented a different case of policy 
promotion.  This case revealed the outcome of an initiative in Serbia when the 
policy was not succinctly communicated, specific in its wishes, and coherent.  
Furthermore, the EU’s energy policy goals in Serbia were not backed by benefits 
that assured Serbia would pursue energy policies aligned with EU interests.   
This was an instance that showed that if there was discord within an organization 
in reference to a certain policy area, the international organization was less likely 
to be able to exert concerted pressure on Serbian elites to adopt a certain policy.  
The discord undermined not only determinacy, but also the benefits.  As such, 
Serbian elites enjoyed more flexibility in their energy policy output.  
Schemmilfennig and Sedelmeier point at that if the target state (in this case 
Serbia) learns about this discord, then “they would be tempted to manipulate it to 
their advantage or simply be confused.”126  The EU’s failure to successfully 
promote its goals in Serbia leads one to believe that less determinate policy 
goals are less likely to achieve their aims in Serbia.  The following illustrates the 
interplay between determinacy and cost-benefit analysis in the three cases 
examined in this paper. 
 It should be noted that this paper is not indictment of the EU’s abilities to 
promote its interests nor should it be considered an endorsement of the manner 
in which the IMF promotes its values.  To the contrary, the very nature of the two 
organizations makes it more likely that the IMF would be more successful in 
pursuing its goals in the short-term.  The huge sum of monetary aid offered by 
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the IMF for imminent use by the targeted state makes the IMF quite persuasive in 
the short-term.  Though the goals of the IMF often include stabilizing the 
economy in the immediate future and laying a basis for a well-functioning 
economy in the long term, the actuality of these goals may be compromised in 
the long-term (and even in the short-term in many instances) by states that do 
not fulfill all the conditionality measures presented by the IMF.   
The ultimate success of the EU in its use of conditionality is based on 
eventual EU membership.  The short-term to medium-term incentive structure of 
complying with EU conditionality is based upon accession aid, progression 
concessions,127 and the right to continue negotiating with the EU.  While these 
incentives are not negligible, they certainly are not as appealing as billions of 
Euro in economic aid.  However, in the long-term, the EU will enjoy more 
success in promoting its goals in Serbia.  This is because as a Candidate State 
closes in on EU membership, the carrot of membership becomes more effective 
in galvanizing change.128  As membership becomes a reality and gains 
immediacy, the EU will be able to place more salience on issues that matter to 
the EU and theoretically be more successful in invoking change in Serbia.  This 
is why the IMF seemed to be more successful than the EU in promoting its goals 
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in Serbia in the short-term, but should not be considered the more successful 
organization in promoting its interests in the long-term.  
 
Figure 16: Determinacy/Cost-Benefit Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Determinate Indeterminate 
 
Benefits > Costs 
  
Successful Compliance 
 
(IMF) 
Partial Compliance 
  
(Energy Policy) 
   
 
Costs > Benefits 
Incomplete Compliance 
 
(Judicial Reform) 
Likely Impasse and 
Minimal Conditionality  
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